Author Archives: Mia Oak

In August 2023, Gabon underwent a major power transition following a successful military coup d’état, the eighth in the region since 2023. The military’s government takeover ended the 55-year dynastic rule of the Bongo regime, which had faced long-standing accusations of widespread corruption and poor governance.

The coup occurred minutes after Ali Bongo, who had taken power following his father’s death, was declared the winner of the 2023 general elections, amid electoral fraud allegations by both the political opposition and the military.

General Nguema, Ali Bongo’s cousin, led the coup and subsequently declared himself as Transitional President in September 2023. While pledging to ensure a swift transition back to civilian rule, Nguema’s regime took several steps following the coup to consolidate the regime’s position of power. These included selecting and appointing all nine members of the Constitutional Court, as well as hosting a highly scripted National Dialogue in mid-2024, during which the military played a prominent role and 200 political parties were banned.

In November 2024, a referendum was held to obtain public approval for the proposed new constitution. The latter provides for a maximum of two presidential terms (extended from five to seven years in length), no prime minister, no dynastic transfer of power, and the abolition of the two round electoral system. The latter therefore lowers the threshold of popular support needed for a candidate to win a presidential election. The ratification of the new constitution was swiftly followed by the introduction of a new law that allows military figures to stand for election.

Post-coup legislative amendments have been viewed by some as means of reinforcing the authority of Gabon’s executive branch, which is already highly centralised. In addition, opposition parties and independent analysts have argued that such changes raise concerns of the military’s intention to remain in power by further eroding checks and balances on the government, which it currently controls.

These concerns are particularly pertinent given the announcement made by coup leader Nguema, who had been open about his intention to run for president since the coup, to announce his candidacy in presidential elections scheduled for April 12, despite the fact that transitional leaders are not usually allowed to run for office.

In March 2025, the Constitutional Court, the members of which were all appointed by Nguema following the coup, approved the coup leader’s candidacy, as well as the former PM. Only one of the eight presidential candidates is a woman.

A black woman with short hair wearing a beige vest gestures while talking to another person at a conference, with a laptop and wood-panel wall in the background.

Commonwealth observers in Gabon for presidential election 2025 | The Commonwealth 2025 © Flickr

Recent developments in Gabon seem to echo findings from a research paper recently published by Inclusive Peace regarding post-coup d’état political trajectories. Using comparative examples from other contexts, this research identified five medium-term scenarios following a successful military coup d’état.

One of these possible transitional trajectories suggests that, following a coup d’état, a military regime may take steps that indicate both a transition back to some form of civilian rule but also a consolidation of the military’s power.

Most often, this will manifest as the military regime following the transition plan to multiparty-elections, while trying to retain influence in the political sphere by either creating its own party or co-opting an existing party or candidate.

As such, the military regime’s actions in Gabon – organising presidential elections but changing the law in order to allow military figures, including the coup leader, to stand for president – may also be viewed in this light.

In addition, research shows that the return to constitutional order is not necessarily sufficient to ensure that a transition back to civilian rule is sustainable since the new constitution in any given context may not incorporate sufficient guarantees for civilian rule going forward. Gabon’s new constitution, in particular the extension of presidential terms and the elimination of certain checks on the President’s power such as the removal of the position of Prime Minister, may therefore prove to be inadequate for a lasting transition to civilian rule.

The outcome of, and the regime’s reaction to, the election on April 12 will provide greater clarity on the extent to which civilian rule in Gabon will be restored. It is possible that these elections will constitute an important step in the military’s promised transition back to civilian rule, while simultaneously working to better ensure continued military dominance of the political space and the Gabonian state.

Maura McGoldrick | Peace Process Support Analyst, Inclusive Peace

Despite the importance of reconstruction in post-conflict settings, the topic has typically been overlooked in many peacebuilding processes. Less than a third of peace agreements since 1990 have included provisions on socio-economic development. Fewer still (10%) have addressed issues pertaining to reconstruction and infrastructure (University of Edinburgh’s Peace Agreements Database). This gap may yet become even more pronounced given the decrease in comprehensive peace agreements, and with the increase in limited ceasefire or cessation of hostilities agreements. In an attempt to address this gap, this blog post explores why reconstruction must be approached inclusively. It draws insights from a recent Inclusive Peace webinar featuring three researchers and practitioners with expertise on reconstruction in the MENA region:

• Dr. Deen Sharp, Visiting Fellow in Human Geography & Environment at the London School of Economics and senior consultant and academic advisor for the Aga Khan Prize for Architecture;

• Dr Nourah Shuaibi, PhD, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University;

• Zozan Alloush, independent political and development consultant and mediator.

The topic of post-conflict reconstruction is more relevant than ever in the MENA region, including in Syria, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Yemen, where several countries are currently undergoing significant political transitions or are engaged in peacemaking processes, which have provided an opening for reconstruction efforts. Similar to other conflict-affected contexts, the issue of reconstruction will be a significant determinant of how post-conflict societies are rebuilt in the region. Inclusive reconstruction processes will enable inclusive societies and, in turn, sustainable peace.

Similar to other conflict-affected contexts, the issue of reconstruction will be a significant determinant of how post-conflict societies are rebuilt in the region. Inclusive reconstruction processes will enable inclusive societies and, in turn, sustainable peace.

The reconstruction of public spaces and socio-economic infrastructure in post-conflict settings is not merely a technical process – it carries significant political and structural implications. Reconstruction efforts can in turn be instrumentalised to exclude certain groups from peace-making and political transition processes, or to ensure the actors and interests which were previously invested in violence, also guarantee and protect their influence and interests in any post-conflict settlement. The engagement of regional and international actors in such contexts, with their associated influence and motives, engenders further complexity.

Two boys search through rubble, carrying a large cushion amidst debris from collapsed concrete buildings in Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territories.

Gaza, Occupied Palestinian Territories | Hosny Salah ©

Additionally, reconstruction provisions establish the new parameters of public life (e.g. accessibility to critical infrastructure, spaces for community gathering, etc.) in the post-conflict environment and can therefore serve to entrench existing structural inequalities in the new post-conflict environment. Examples of such dynamics are already visible across a number of protracted conflict settings. The potential for the enactment of further violence through the reconstruction or “post-conflict” phase is perhaps most apparent in Gaza. Continued Israeli restrictions on Palestinians’ mobility and the blockade of goods entering Gaza are actively preventing its inhabitants from clearing the rubble left in the wake of Israeli missile strikes and rebuilding, thereby further entrenching a vast and long-standing power imbalance. As such, pathways to inclusive reconstruction need to be situated in the broader context of peace-making and political transition processes.

Citing the example of the Assad regime’s weaponisation of the reconstruction process in Syria from the beginning of the civil conflict in 2011, Dr. Sharp described how laws around property rights were changed to create exclusive zones, thereby feeding certain social elites and excluding and restricting any group viewed as opposing these elites.

As a means of fostering conversation on this pertinent and underexplored topic and its link to peacebuilding in complex geopolitical contexts, Inclusive Peace recently hosted an online webinar to discuss civil society inclusion in post-conflict reconstruction. Dr. Sharp began the conversation by sharing his reflections, which, linking to the example of Gaza, centred the idea of reconstruction as violence and as facet of conflict itself, which he further elucidates in a forthcoming book (Reconstruction as Violence in Syria, 2025, AUC press). Citing the example of the Assad regime’s weaponisation of the reconstruction process in Syria from the beginning of the civil conflict in 2011, Dr. Sharp described how laws around property rights were changed to create exclusive zones, thereby feeding certain social elites and excluding and restricting any group viewed as opposing these elites. As such, reconstruction policies were utilised to serve a particular political agenda and further entrench existing inequalities.

On a global scale, as issues of conflict and urbanisation and their intersection are becoming increasingly complex, the misappropriation of reconstruction policies to feed specific political agendas is increasingly likely. Dr. Sharp emphasised that the key to the success and sustainability of any reconstruction process is to ensure that this is not exclusively conceived or implemented in a top-down manner, but rather centres the needs and desires of the inhabitants themselves who will be subject to this reconstruction. As suggested by Dr. Sharp, whilst bottom-up inclusive reconstruction is vital in post-war and peacebuilding contexts, the multilateral environment remains valid and valuable for the development of clear global principles to be laid out to guide locally led reconstruction processes. Particularly in cases where the state has been decimated by conflict, it becomes necessary to have some sources of support that are institutional and structural.

Moreover, state-building since the 1990s has included specific ideas about what a ‘new’ state should like, which has typically prioritised the establishment of some form of free-market economy and liberal economy.

Offering a differing but complementary perspective, Dr. Shuaibi argued that, in the context of increasingly complex conflict realities, for example in the MENA region, the age of multilateral frameworks established by international agencies is ending. Such frameworks, as highlighted by Dr. Shuaibi, have usually been based on a traditional state-building model and a top-down and elite-driven approach, under the supervision of international actors. Moreover, state-building since the 1990s has included specific ideas about what a ‘new’ state should like, which has typically prioritised the establishment of some form of free-market economy and liberal economy. Afghanistan and Iraq are cases in point. In today’s climate, Dr. Shuaibi suggested that a policy of what she termed “reparative justice” in processes of state-building and reconstruction, which is predicated on a grassroots and survivor-led approach including reconciliation through education and restitution, is more appropriate. Echoing Dr. Sharp’s point about the need to centre the needs and desires of inhabitants where reconstruction will take place, Dr. Shuaibi advocated for the localisation of state-building and reconstruction processes, with international actors acting only as a support system.

A man stands in a doorway of a crumbling brick structure on a clear day, surrounded by rubble and remnants of buildings in Idlib, Syria.

Idlib, Syria | Ahmed Akacha ©

Ms. Alloush, who joined the webinar from Syria, shared her impressions of the sheer scale of infrastructure destruction in the country, which far surpasses anything that could be captured in a report or statistics. She stressed that decentralised thinking and planning for reconstruction is crucial in the Syrian case, most significantly since the current authorities control only 50 percent of the country’s territory and communities in different parts of the country have different needs as they recover from years of conflict. However, the approach to this process thus far seems to have been focused on attracting foreign investment and therefore on the “strategic reconstruction” of areas most relevant for external actors looking to invest in the reconstruction process, such as airports, oil extraction sites, and ports. As such, it seems that the reconstruction process in Syria remains top-down and dominated by the new authorities, at the expense of Syrians facing the rebuilding of their lives as well as their country.

The fruitful discussion between these three speakers suggests that bridging the gap between research and practice when it comes to the issue of inclusive reconstruction in the context of peacebuilding and peace-making, whilst incredibly challenging, must involve bringing together stakeholders invested and engaged in this area in different ways, from academics to practitioners. The online webinar, whilst facilitating an interesting and engaging exchange, should therefore be seen as only the beginning of a much wider conversation.

Maura McGoldrick | Peace Process Support Analyst, Inclusive Peace

Stay up to speed with peacebuilding: get our latest toolkits, comparative research, and events straight to your inbox. Sign up to our quarterly newsletter.

Patriarchal backlash and increasing levels of armed conflict are currently compounding long-standing challenges to women’s meaningful participation in peacemaking and peacebuilding. In various contexts, building collaboration and coalitions have served as an effective strategy in this regard.

Comparative research shows that advocating for a common agenda can be an effective means for women to make themselves heard during and after peace and political transition processes. Burundi, Colombia, the DRC, Nepal, the Philippines, and Northern Ireland are cases in point.

Women-led coalitions’ primary purpose naturally depends on the specificities of the context women peacebuilders are operating in. A nuanced, context-specific approach is therefore key for making coalition building work.

Women coalitions emerging under conditions of escalating armed conflict usually focus on mitigating the dire consequences of large-scale combat. Sudanese women, for example, formed networks and initiatives following the outbreak of the armed conflict between the SAF and the RSF on 15 April 2023 to advocate for peace talks and women’s inclusion therein; to conduct shuttle diplomacy efforts; provide humanitarian relief; and document human rights violations committed by conflict parties.

In recent consultations organised by Inclusive Peace featuring Sudanese women, forming a coherent women-led anti-war movement that pushes for the pursuit of inclusive peace talks was cited as a key priority. Developing a joint roadmap for women from different Sudanese regions to implement the resolutions from the 2024 Geneva talks emerged as a tangible entry point in this regard.

Armed fighting obviously undermines efforts to connect individual women-led initiatives inside Sudan, while also reinforcing and shaping political and social fragmentation. However, wherever the security situation permits, efforts to strengthen collaboration and coordination among Sudanese women can facilitate their ongoing advocacy and humanitarian relief activities while also giving them a space to plan their involvement in any ongoing or future peacemaking initiative. Any related coalition building effort may also target active women fighters to give women peacemakers and peacebuilders access to the conflict parties.

A coalition building success story: The CWVND in Ethiopia

The Coalition for Women’s Voice in the National Dialogue (CWVND) in Ethiopia shows that coalition building can enhance women’s leverage over ongoing peacemaking initiatives in various ways. Importantly, this also applies to alternative peacemaking spaces like the country’s ongoing National Dialogue process, which is currently proceeding in the absence of a formal peace process.

CWVND, which was established in March 2022, currently encompasses over 50 women-led CSOs from Ethiopia. Its members’ joint commitment to ensuring women’s meaningful participation in Ethiopia’s national dialogue at the national level more broadly is the glue that holds the coalition together.

Two of CWVND’s activities are worthy of particularly close attention.

First, in 2023, the coalition planned and implemented consultations with more than 3,000 women from eight subnational regions and two city administrations. CWVND and TIMRAN (ትምራን), which serves as the coalition’s secretariat, subsequently condensed women’s priorities, concerns, and demands into a succinct 10-point women’s agenda, which they shared with the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (ENDC).

Second, CWVND and TIMRAN trained 151 women as consultation facilitators. The ENDC subsequently deployed 28 of those trained women facilitators for the regional agenda consultations under the national dialogue process.

Three key lessons emerge from the CWVND’s work regarding coalition building and its capacity to promote women’s participation in alternative peacemaking spaces like National Dialogues:

➜ Be quick: CWVND started preparing agenda setting women’s consultations soon after the ENDC officially started operating in February 2022. This short reaction period allowed CWVND to be ahead of the curve in the national dialogue process and increase its visibility during the agenda setting phase.

➜ Maximise local ownership: CWVND had significant agency throughout the agenda consolidation process. Ethiopian women hence own the resulting agenda, which provides them with a strong foundation for advocating for a transformation of women’s position in Ethiopia’s society during the national dialogue and beyond.

➜ Support women with diversifying their participation modalities in peacemaking spaces: Women-led coalitions can support women with entering and influencing peacemaking spaces in different functions. The ENDC’s decision to draw on 28 CWVND-trained women facilitators indicates that CWVND’s training interventions have strengthened women’s reputation as stakeholders with relevant thematic knowledge, skills, and expertise regarding the national dialogue. Their formal involvement as facilitators and technical experts allows women to shape the national dialogue process in various roles.

Coalition building: Challenges and implications for external supporters

Building coalitions among women comes with multi-faceted challenges. Four issues stand out. First, women are a heterogeneous group. They often pursue different political agendas and disagree on the priorities and ideal outcomes of a peace or political transition process, particularly in more polarised environments. In Nepal, for example, women representatives in the first Constituent Assembly focused on advancing the position of their respective political party rather than women’s rights.

Second, women peacemakers and peacebuilders operating in conflict-affected and more markedly patriarchal contexts often encounter severe threats and backlash in the physical and digital space. Abduction, arbitrary arrests, rape, defamation, slander, smear campaigns, and intimidation make coalition building a dangerous undertaking. Managing and mitigating those risks is therefore a key pillar of any impactful coalition building effort.

Third, women-led coalitions may only enable women’s meaningful participation if they can grow organically and make independent decisions about which activities they want to pursue. The case of the women-led civil society organisation Ugaaso in Ethiopia’s Somali region shows that strong and vocal women coalitions take time to evolve, yet can make a significant impact along the way.

Fourth, women often lack information and awareness of other ongoing women-led peacemaking initiatives, which can constrain their collaboration and coordination. In Yemen, for example, women often receive information about ongoing mediation initiatives very late in the day, if at all, which significantly constrains their efforts to collectively strategise and influence those processes.

The next iteration of this series on participation will draw on Ethiopian women’s recent coalition building experiences to highlight lessons learned regarding the practicalities of addressing some of those challenges and establishing and maintaining a women-led coalition.

In the meantime, several entry points exist for the international community to enhance women’s coalition building efforts. For example, skilful external facilitation and technical as well as financial accompaniment can help women to develop trustful relationships with each other through repeated exchanges.

External actors’ commitment to serving as a long-term companion can also bolster a women’s coalition’s development. The same holds for local ownership. As indicated above, providing on-demand, subtle support from behind the scenes allows external actors to maximise women’s agency in any coalition building initiative.

Philip Poppelreuter | Researcher, Inclusive Peace

This blog is part of Inclusive Peace’s 2025 series on women’s effective participation in peace processes. The series examines context-sensitive strategies women have successfully pursued or could pursue to shape peacemaking and peacebuilding in a changing geopolitical context marked by increasing levels of armed conflict, greater multipolarity – both in general and more specifically in terms of mediation actors – and a decline in comprehensive peace processes and agreements led by the UN. It is based on comparative findings of a project Inclusive Peace is undertaking in partnership with the Irish DFA in the run-up to the 25th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 in October 2025.

The prospect of negotiations to end the war in Ukraine starting soon has become more likely over the past three weeks, particularly following US-Ukraine talks in Jeddah this week. This blog explores entry points for preparing for comprehensive peace negotiations that can give rise to just and lasting peace in Ukraine.

Events surrounding the war in Ukraine have come thick and fast over the past three weeks, with significant progress towards a ceasefire over the past week.

US-Russia talks in Riyadh in mid-February sent a clear signal that both sides are seeking to improve their bilateral relationship and jointly discuss a potential end to the war in Ukraine. Ukraine’s absence from the talks was notable.

Subsequently, France and the UK started working on a proposed peace plan to end the war in Ukraine, including a limited one-month truce covering the seas, the air, and Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Several Western countries have also indicated their willingness to join a coalition of the willing proposed by UK prime minister Keir Starmer to back a potential ceasefire in Ukraine through boots on the ground.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy then presented a proposal for a partial ceasefire last week, and publicly expressed Ukraine’s readiness to enter ceasefire negotiations. The announcement followed the chaotic meeting between Zelenskiy, US president Donald Trump, and US vice president JD Vance at the Oval Office on 28 February and the subsequent suspension of all US military aid and intelligence support to Ukraine.

Events took another significant turn following a meeting between high-level representatives of the US and Ukraine in Jeddah on Tuesday this week. Zelenskiy publicly expressed Ukraine’s commitment to accept an immediate 30-day ceasefire covering the entire frontline, the seas, and the air as proposed by the US if Russia did the same. In return, the Trump administration announced the immediate resumption of all military aid flows to Ukraine. US representatives also committed to tabling their ceasefire proposal with Russian counterparts. Russia’s response to this development remains to be seen at the time of writing.

Novoselovka, Ukraine | Ales Uscinaw ©

Preparing for comprehensive peace negotiations

Diplomatic coordination between state leaders is only one of several preparatory activities ahead of peace negotiations. While state leaders are currently focused on reaching a ceasefire, the fact that US and Ukraine representatives agreed to set up teams of negotiators to begin preparations for a comprehensive peace negotiation process during their meeting in Jeddah this week, indicates that discussions are also looking beyond a ceasefire. Both ceasefire and comprehensive peace negotiations require thorough preparation, which can be mutually reinforcing.

Our report “Negotiating an End to the War in Ukraine” draws on comparative evidence to provide an in-depth discussion of six tangible entry points for preparing a comprehensive peace negotiation process. Each preparatory activity adheres to the core principle that any future negotiation process must involve Ukraine to enable a just and sustainable peace.

Preparatory activity 1: Deepening coordination among states who are willing to support negotiations

A higher number of supportive states amplify the financial, technical, and human resources available to enable comprehensive peace negotiations. Potential state supporters of negotiations could therefore proactively highlight the value of their inclusion in the negotiation process to the conflict parties. Previous exploratory initiatives from Türkiye, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, India, China, and Indonesia indicate that these actors might be interested in supporting a negotiation process.

Coordinating and streamlining planning activities of interested states can enhance the preparation for peace negotiations. Division of labour and allocation of roles in the negotiation process are two key themes for states to discuss. France and the UK could draw on their nascent ceasefire initiative to reach out to state leaders from the Global South to strengthen and diversify diplomatic coordination mechanisms among state supporters for peace negotiations.

France and the UK could draw on their nascent ceasefire initiative to reach out to state leaders from the Global South to strengthen and diversify diplomatic coordination mechanisms among state supporters for peace negotiations.

Following initial discussions, state supporters of negotiations could discuss the establishment of an institutionalised coordination platform for the entire peace process. Contact groups, groups of friends supporting the mediator(s), and groups of monitors that served as guarantors for an agreement are examples for diplomatic coordination mechanisms in previous peace processes.

Preparatory activity 2: Preparing the substance for the negotiation agenda

A major part of the preparation for negotiations involves discussing the substance of the prospective discussions. State actors and experts from civil society and business could conduct a comprehensive conflict analysis to identify the most salient issues that negotiations will likely have to address.

Negotiation parties could draw on the conflict analysis to establish thematic working groups to prepare the substantive discussions under each agenda item. Individual states, multilateral actors such as the UN, or large civil society organisations with thematic expertise could facilitate those working groups. Frequent exchange between the individual thematic working groups could enable informed decisions regarding the sequencing of agenda items during negotiations.

Preparatory activity 3: Setting up thematic expert groups that accompany the substantive, logistical, legal, and administrative preparations

Legal advisors, businesspeople, administrative and logistical, as well as country and regional specialists, among others, have relevant expertise that can enrich the discussions of the thematic working groups mentioned above. This pertains to potential compromises for addressing specific drivers, the evaluation of peace process design options as well as logistical tasks related to peace negotiations.

Informal expert groups comprising think tanks and other non-state actors can also support thematic working groups, the mediator(s), and civil society groups with the various facets of their preparatory work. Drafting confidential thematic non-papers and offering capacity building exercises are two tangible entry points in this regard.

Preparatory activity 4: Tapping into peace process support expertise

Academic and civil society actors and institutions with a track record in peace process support can help conflict parties and mediators to anticipate and deal with various scenarios in which peace negotiations might unfold. Peace process support experts, once connected with conflict parties and mediator(s), can provide ideas, options, and guidance on how to:

➜ Sequence agenda items

➜ Enhance negotiating parties’ trust in the viability of the negotiation process;

➜ Mitigate external pressure for rushed negotiations;

➜ Mitigate potential sources of resistance to negotiations;

➜ Deal with situations where negotiations get stuck or risk being derailed.

Peace process support experts can also enhance civil society actors who seek to shape the preparations for as well as the actual negotiation phase.

Preparatory activity 5: Forming civil society alliances to shape and enhance preparations for negotiations and thereby strengthen national ownership

Civil society actors have vast subject matter expertise, networks, and mediation skills, which can enhance preparations for negotiations. They can also serve as intermediaries between state actors preparing for negotiations to the broader population and vice versa.

Creating dedicated spaces for Ukrainian civil society, women’s organisations, religious groups, the business community, and diaspora members to flag their priorities and positions around anticipated negotiation topics could allow them to complement the preparatory work of Ukrainian state representatives. Strong connections between those civil society spaces and the formal preparatory and negotiation process would also be conducive to enhance feelings of national ownership in the process. External actors could provide on-demand financial and technical facilitation accompaniment support to any informal consultations among Ukrainian non-state actors.

Civil society actors have vast subject matter expertise, networks, and mediation skills, which can enhance preparations for negotiations. They can also serve as intermediaries between state actors preparing for negotiations to the broader population and vice versa.

Recent dynamics suggest that Ukrainian civil society inclusion in the negotiation process is likely to be unrealistic. The prospect of involvement or consultation of Russian civil society actors is essentially nil. Working on strategies to gradually enhance the inclusivity of the negotiation process can help non-state actors to prepare for the scenario under which potential mediators/facilitators or certain conflict parties push for exclusive peace talks.

Preparatory activity 6: Developing communication strategies to build public trust in the negotiation process

Media and communication experts, policy makers, and civil society representatives could jointly work on consistent messaging on why and how preparing for negotiations strengthens Ukraine’s position. Public events such as panel discussions or workshops as well as media coverage of peace process support experts could enhance public knowledge about the role negotiations play in ending wars.

Conflict parties and states involved in the negotiation process would ideally also prepare a communication strategy for the pre-negotiation and negotiation phase. Any such communication strategy could define the amount of information and the frequency of updates on the negotiation process that will be relayed to the public. Specific strategies to deal with misinformation campaigns and prevent information leaks during the negotiations would be equally key.